India’s climate commitments and the gap between capacity and emissions.

India’s Climate Position

India is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases and also one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change impacts. Its climate policy sits at a critical intersection of real ambition constrained by real development needs. India’s position, consistently stated at every Conference of the Parties, is that it will not sacrifice economic growth for climate targets and that developed countries must provide the finance and technology to enable faster decarbonisation in developing economies.

India ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2016 and submitted its first Nationally Determined Contribution setting three main targets for 2030. At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, India’s Hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi Ji announced five enhanced commitments titled the “Panchamrit” — including a Net-Zero by 2070 goal, which India has made a key pillar of its long-term climate strategy. In August 2022, India formally updated its NDC, strengthening the emissions intensity and non-fossil capacity targets. Both of those updated targets have now effectively been met ahead of schedule.

The 2035 NDC

India has approved its updated Nationally Determined Contribution for 2031–2035, committing to reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 47% from 2005 levels, achieve 60% of installed power capacity from non-fossil sources, and create an additional carbon sink of 3.5 to 4 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent through forest and tree cover by 2035. This builds on its track record of exceeding earlier targets ahead of schedule, aligned with its long-term vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047 and Net-Zero by 2070. India’s strategy integrates large-scale renewable expansion, green hydrogen, storage, CCUS and climate-resilient infrastructure, while strengthening adaptation, institutional capacity and community-driven initiatives.

Assessment from independent bodies, however, like the Climate Action Tracker is that India’s targets, while stronger on paper than the original NDC, are close to what current policies will deliver anyway — meaning they will not drive substantial additional emissions reductions beyond business as usual. India’s overall climate action is rated “Highly Insufficient” against a 1.5°C pathway, with total emissions projected to continue rising through 2030 and beyond under current policies.

The Capacity-Emissions Gap

This is the broader context in which India’s industrial decarbonisation story plays out. The power sector has delivered on capacity targets, but generation from coal remains at around 75% because renewable capacity additions are outpaced by demand growth. Non-fossil installed capacity has crossed 52.57% — exceeding the earlier 2030 target five years ahead of schedule — but actual generation from non-fossil sources remains far lower because capacity factors for solar and wind are lower than for coal. The gap between these two numbers — the installed capacity number that looks good and the generation number that shows the real picture — is where most of the complexity in India’s energy transition lies.

For India’s industrial sectors specifically, the relevant question is not what share of India’s total installed capacity is non-fossil, but what the carbon intensity of the grid is at the point when they draw power from it. That number — the Grid Emission Factor published by the Central Electricity Authority — is what determines CCTS Scope 2 obligations and CBAM Scope 2 embedded emissions calculations. As of December 2025, India’s Weighted Average Emission Factor is 0.710 tCO₂/MWh under CEA V21.0.